CTM: The results and financing

Corporate Travel Management (CTM) has now put hard numbers around the issues that have kept its shares suspended for a year. The picture is clearer, although it remains challenging. 

CTM is not obviously heading for insolvency. It remains a large, profitable travel business with strong client retention and valuable technology. 

However, a historically debt-light company now needs expensive private credit to fund customer repayments arising from its billing and accounting issues. That distinction is central to understanding its position.

1. The PEP loan

The $175 million financing package from PEP Credit, the credit arm of Pacific Equity Partners, replaces CTM’s previous $75 million corporate facility. Meanwhile, CTM’s existing lenders continue to provide a $65 million IATA guarantee and other transactional facilities.

The IATA guarantee covers CTM’s obligations to airlines through IATA’s settlement system. The other transactional facilities are banking services such as payment, cash management and related operational facilities that CTM needs to keep functioning normally.

PEP completed extensive commercial, financial, legal and operational due diligence before committing the money.

This offers reassurance in one respect: an experienced institutional lender has examined the business and is prepared to fund it. 

However, it is not an overall vote of confidence offered without substantial protections. The debt is secured, carries a floating interest rate and is subject to strict repayment and performance conditions, along with regular reviews.

Under the package, CTM must keep the business healthy enough to meet those conditions, fund an estimated $20 million a year in borrowing costs and repay the outstanding debt in full by August 2029. 

It must also pay a termination fee equal to four percent of its market capitalisation when the facilities are repaid in full. Based on the current suspended share price, that would be about $94 million.

CTM would presumably hope its share price returns to at least that level within three years. A $94 million fee is significant for a company that took many years of strong, unimpeded growth with extraordinary profit margins to build a cash position of that size. 

If CTM’s share price returned to its historic high, the termination fee due in three years would be around $150 million.

PEP is taking material credit risk, but it has protected itself through security, covenants, review events and a large exit fee. This structure allows PEP to use its lending expertise to manage risk and earn a high margin.

Private credit does not always succeed, with Godfreys and REDgroup among the examples, but those experiences can also inform subsequent lending decisions. That’s what we’re seeing here.

CTM expects borrowing costs of about $20 million a year, based on how much it expects to draw. 

The cost could rise if its forecasts for client retention and growth are not met. In that scenario, lower revenue could contribute to greater borrowing, creating the risk of a negative cycle.

These observations focus on the financing risks rather than the company’s most favourable interpretation of the package, but they are material to understanding its present position.

The termination fee

In addition to borrowing costs, the package includes a termination fee equal to four percent of CTM’s market capitalisation when the facilities are repaid in full, plus extra charges on some parts of the debt if they are repaid early.

The four percent feature, worth about $94 million at the current suspended share price, is unusual and functions more like a substantial exit fee. It rewards PEP for enabling CTM to rebuild by giving it a share of the value restored during the financing term. The more valuable CTM becomes, the larger the exit payment.

PEP Credit has not disclosed any equity option or takeover right, so the disclosed terms do not support characterising the arrangement as a disguised acquisition. 

However, the economics indicate that CTM had limited bargaining power. The company needed certainty and liquidity and accepted expensive funding with a large exit payment if the recovery succeeds.

The FY25 accounts help explain why CTM prioritised that certainty.

2. The results

CTM reported FY25 revenue and other income of $643.4 million and underlying EBITDA of $83.6 million, down from a restated $116.4 million. 

The statutory loss for shareholders was $348.5 million, though most of it was non-cash. 

CTM wrote off $357.7 million of goodwill, including all $192.1 million attached to Europe and partial write-downs of $89.1 million in ANZ and $76.5 million in North America. Net assets fell from $1.015 billion to $578.8 million.

“Impairment” is the accounting term for reducing earlier valuations. No cash leaves the business as a direct result of the impairment, but CTM is acknowledging that parts of its acquired businesses can no longer support the values previously carried in its accounts. 

Any buyer would now assess them using more conservative assumptions. Profits indicate how the business is performing today, while ‘asset’ values in a service business indicate the confidence attached to its future performance.

The goodwill reduction

The reductions are:

  • Europe: 100 percent = $192.1m, completely written off to zero
  • Australasia: 41 percent = $89.1m, leaving $126.1m
  • North America: 17 percent = $76.5m, leaving $383.2m
  • Asia: 0 percent impairment. However, CTM warned that a further deterioration could cause an impairment


A buyer assessing CTM today could no longer rely on the values in the earlier accounts or price the business solely on its established reputation and trust. A buyer would need to assess existing assets using more conservative assumptions. In practical terms, the business could be worth less in a sale and have fewer assets to support its borrowings.

3. The financials

The restatement

A significant feature of the annual report is the restatement of CTM’s financial history. FY24 revenue, originally reported at $710.4 million, has been reduced by $82.6 million to $637.1 million. 

FY24 profit after tax fell from $86.4 million as originally presented to $20.9 million after restatement. Basic earnings per share fell from 57.9 cents to 13 cents.

CTM’s previously reported FY24 profitability was significantly overstated.

The UK findings

The UK findings extend beyond revenue recognition alone. 

CTM’s own annual report says amounts were charged in excess of contractual entitlement. It identifies “erroneous billing, unmatched sales and supplier purchases, supplier refunds not passed through to customers, duplicate billing, other conduct and contractual ambiguity”. 

The problems extended across financial years 2019 to 2025. The fact that the issues continued across six financial years makes them difficult to characterise as a short-lived or isolated accounting error.

The debt overhang

On 30 June 2025, CTM recognised $255.2 million of customer-related liabilities and another $58.9 million of other refund liabilities. Settlement agreements subsequently reduced and deferred much of that exposure, but the cash burden remains material. 

The current remediation program is roughly $246 million, with substantial payments scheduled through FY27 and into FY28. 

CTM’s own presentation says it expects to fund this through $107 million of June 2026 cash, about $62 million of tax refunds, $36 million of other net cash flows and the $175 million PEP facility.

This is central to understanding CTM’s present condition. The business may continue, but a substantial share of its future cash generation has already been allocated.

The recovery and regional mix

The December 2025 half-year produced revenue and other income of $345.2 million, up six percent, and underlying EBITDA of $66.9 million, up 17 percent. 

CTM now forecasts FY26 underlying EBITDA of about $113.6 million and TTV of $9.8 billion. However, the headline recovery needs to be considered in its regional context.

Europe produced $20.1 million of first-half EBITDA compared with only $2.5 million a year earlier, while ANZ EBITDA fell 28 percent. 

Regionally, EBITDA outside Europe declined materially. Part of Europe’s rebound came from project work and revised pricing. Project work can depend on the decisions of a relatively small group of people on the client side.

Europe therefore drove the improvement in the headline number, while the rest of the group recorded a decline. It is also the region under the greatest financial, operational and reputational pressure.

Deloitte’s qualified opinions

Deloitte did not issue CTM with a clean FY25 audit opinion. It issued a qualified opinion because it “could not obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence” over a number of CTM Europe balances and adjustments. 

The later 1H26 review was also qualified. Deloitte said, “… we were unable to conclude on the existence, accuracy, completeness and classification of CTM Europe’s trade and other payables and trade and other receivables…” 

In more typical circumstances, a qualification like this would be a major focus.

Deloitte was unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence over European receivable and payable balances totalling about $298 million and therefore could not conclude on their existence and accuracy.

The relisting process

CTM lodged its long-delayed FY25 annual report and 1H26 accounts on 27 August. The ASX immediately confirmed that the suspension would continue. 

The next hurdle is CTM’s FY26 Preliminary Final Report, due by 31 August. Only after that is lodged will the ASX decide whether it is appropriate to restore CTM to the boards.

Relisting is therefore much more likely, but it is not automatic. CTM’s CFO told analysts that the company expects the FY26 accounts early this week and does not expect the qualified FY25 opinion to prevent reinstatement.

I expect CTM to trade again eventually. My earlier expectations proved incorrect because I hadn’t anticipated PEP’s involvement. CTM’s advisers have since helped secure a path forward for management.

The company has now quantified most of the remediation, obtained committed finance, maintained IATA support and produced current financial information. 

The ASX does not have to certify CTM as healthy. It needs to be satisfied that the market can trade on sufficiently reliable information and that reinstatement is otherwise appropriate. 

The ASX is not a court and does not determine or impose punishment. Its role is to facilitate a safe investment channel between businesses and investors.

Relisting could nevertheless produce a difficult market adjustment. If and when trading resumes, the market will price in a year’s worth of adverse developments almost immediately.

The last traded price of $16.07 reflects a different CTM: the company as it was understood before the full customer liability, the substantial restatements, the goodwill reductions, the costly PEP debt and two qualified auditor conclusions were known.

4. Takeover talk

A takeover is now more plausible than it was when CTM was suspended amid substantial uncertainty, because buyers can finally see the shape of the liabilities. 

However, I think the best buyer will still wait. The FY26 numbers need to be released, the stock needs to reopen and establish a market price, the residual settlements need to be finalised, and the regulatory and litigation risks need to become clearer. Each step reduces uncertainty and could also reduce what a buyer ultimately has to pay.

Flight Centre appears unlikely as a buyer for now. Chris Galanty, Global Corporate CEO, was asked this week whether it would consider buying CTM. He quickly answered, “No is the short answer.”

Another candidate could be a well-funded online travel group seeking to expand its business travel operations. Several obvious candidates fit that description.

Strategically, CTM would give a buyer immediate global scale, nearly $10 billion of TTV, proprietary technology, major government and corporate accounts, experienced teams and strong positions in Australia, North America and parts of Asia. 

However, a whole-company buyer would also inherit the debt, repayment commitments, control overhaul and reputational exposure. 

Neither side would be likely to move before the stock market establishes CTM’s new value. If the company doesn’t relist, the situation becomes more complicated.

The takeover question has therefore changed. It is no longer primarily whether CTM will collapse and who might acquire the remaining assets. The PEP funding makes a disorderly collapse much less likely. 

The question now is whether CTM can recover sufficiently to remain independent before another party decides the surviving franchise would be worth more under a stronger owner.

5. In conclusion

In summary, CTM has bought time, but not complete freedom from its constraints. PEP has financed the bridge. The customer settlements have placed boundaries around much of the damage. Relisting should expose the company to a real market price again. Once that price exists, the takeover arithmetic becomes much simpler.

If the reopened value is strong, perhaps above $8, CTM can argue for independence and rebuild. If the market marks it down heavily, perhaps below $3, the financing that keeps it operating may also make a sale more attractive. 

These are indicative, judgement-based numbers informed by my experience as a former stockbroker.

A well-funded strategic buyer could refinance the expensive debt using the strength of its own assets, potentially halving the risk and repayments. It could also remove duplicated corporate costs and acquire a genuinely valuable global client platform at a fraction of its former perceived value.

A sale, rather than insolvency, may now be CTM’s more relevant potential endgame. Such an outcome could benefit stakeholders, particularly PEP given its position in the financing structure.